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1 Introduction 
1.1 Presenting International Humanitarian Law and the concept of direct participation 
in hostilities 
International Humanitarian Law, or IHL, often referred to demotically as the laws of war, 
is an international legal entity regulating armed conflict, mainly between states due to its 
historic origins, but also armed conflict of a non-international essence, or civil war. It 
regulates the conduct of belligerents and their responsibilities toward each other and 
notably the civilian population, ius in bello, and also to some extent ius ad bellum.  
 
IHL is based on international treaties, and the main bodies of legal sources are the 
Hague Convention, the four Geneva Conventions and the two Protocol Additions to the 
Geneva Conventions. There is also a notable customary law of  armed conflict. 
 
IHL distinguishes between two different stati in armed conflict, combatants and civilians. 
The distinction is essentially between those who have the right to perform acts of war in 
armed conflict, and those who have no such right.  
 
Protection of the civilian population is one of the main purposes of IHL, and the law 
dictates that no civilian can be a legitimate military target in armed conflict, unlike 
persons with combatant status. However, IHL does stipulate that civilians may be 
legitimate targets if they participate directly in hostilities, and then for the duration of this 
participation. The relevant provision in Additional Protocol I is: ”Civilians shall enjoy the 
protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities”. This entails a suspension of the protection afforded civilians under IHL. 
Accordingly, defining what constitutes such direct participation in hostilities is of 
paramount importance, firstly to protect innocent civilians from being wrongly targeted, 
and secondly to facilitate combatants’ possibility to adhere to IHL and engender respect 
for the laws of armed conflict. 
 
1.2 Specifics pertaining to this paper 
Direct participation in hostilities (acronym DPH, both designations used interchangeably 
hereafter) is a much debated subject. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), as well as numerous authors, have contemplated and discussed the subject 
extensively. 
 
The subject of this paper is the core of the DPH rule: what constitutes civilian direct 
participation in hostilities under IHL. The main questions are: 
 
• What is hostilities in this context 
• What makes participation in such hostilities direct 
• How should the temporal aspect of this be treated, regarding suspension of 
protection 
• How are the ideas behind IHL itself best protected regarding DPH 
 
The discussion will first address briefly the principle of distinction between civilians and 
combatants in IHL in relevance to DPH, before concentrating on the main issues of 
debate in DPH analysis: ”hostilities”, direct vs. indirect participation, and the temporal 
aspect of DPH. Precautions in situations of doubt will also be addressed briefly. 
 
The subject will be treated with the base idea that theoretical rationality must at all times 
be weighed against practical applicability. A solution that best suits the idea behind and 
purpose of IHL in practice will be the best solution. Such a practical approach is also of 
paramount value because the legal framework of armed combat must be suited to the 
needs and practices of both armed forces and civilians inhabiting areas of armed 
conflict, lest the general respect for and effectiveness of the law be rendered nugatory.  
 
A distinction between international armed conflict (IAC, the terms used interchangeably 
hereafter) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC) is made by IHL treaty law. 
Whether DPH is discussed within the context of an IAC or a NIAC, the main 
considerations behind the analysis will remain substantially the same. Specific elements 
pertaining particularly to either will be pointed out if constituent parts of the analysis 
requires divergent treatment. 
 
”Classification” of civilians into categories that determine how they be regarded in a 
DPH-situation will also be discussed. Neither human shielding, the problem of civilian 
contractors performing various tasks in a situation of armed conflict, nor so-called 
”targeted killings” will be treated, all being outside the scope of this paper.  
 
 
1.3 Methodology and sources 
For the purposes of this paper, the common methodology of international law will be 
employed in accordance with the statutes of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) art. 
38. Accordingly, the treaties of main relevance to this paper will be the four Geneva 
Conventions of August 12. 1949 (GC), with its two additional protocols of June 8. 1977 
(AP I and AP II). The provisions specifically regulating civilian direct participation in 
hostilities are of principal relevance: art. 51 (3) AP I, art. 13 (3) AP II and Common 
Article 3 (CA 3) to the Geneva Conventions. 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentaries to the GCs and AP 
I and II have been frequently consulted. 
 
There is also a notable customary law of armed conflict, extensively commented upon 
and treated in an ICRC study; it is an extensive endeavour to clarify such customary law 
and thus pertinent to this paper with its treatment of DPH. It is worth noting that, whilst 
the treaties mentioned only binds states that have ratified them, customary IHL is 
regarded as being applicable to all instances of armed conflict and consequently binds 
all actors in such conflict.  
 
Regarding court rulings, the Supreme Court of Israel’s judgement pertaining to the 
Israeli Government’s policy of targeted killings (hereafter dubbed PCATI v. Israel) is of 
particular appositeness, discussing DPH extensively.  
 Of particular interest is also the three ICRC meetings specifically deliberating the issue 
of DPH (hereafter dubbed first, second and third ICRC meeting), from which the ICRC 
have released summary reports. They took place from 2003-2005, with numerous 
experts on the field participating, consequently providing an insight into the main aspects 
of today’s DPH debate. One should, however, bear in mind that the summary reports are 
essentially summarising  discussions, and their value as legal sources should stand 
relative to that fact.    
 
Literature on the issue of DPH is otherwise rather scarce, mainly consisting of individual 
articles from various publications. These will be employed where they are relevant.  
 
Fleck’s comprehensive handbook on IHL is useful in providing overview of the subject of 
DPH and IHL, and has been much used for general reference.  
2 The Principle of distinction 
The principle of distinction is one of the fundamental principles of international 
humanitarian law. In armed conflict, the lawfulness of deprivation of life depends on 
whether the targeted person is a legitimate military objective or not. This notion was 
expressed in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 - ”(...) the only legitimate object 
which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces 
of the enemy”. Demonstrably, the age old idea that only military objectives of 
applicational value to the adversary may be attacked, while those not of such value be 
left alone, is axiomatically expressed in this sentence. The most clear expression of the 
principle is found in art. 48, AP I, with an articulate wording regarding the obligation to 
distinguish between civilian and combatant: ”In order to ensure respect for and 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at 
all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives”. 
 Thus, the principle of distinction does not permit attacks on the peaceful civilian 
population and civilian objects of no military value, only against the armed forces of the 
adversary and other military objectives.  
 
In addition to being long established customary law in both international and 
non-international armed conflict, the principle of distinction is codified in a number of 
provisions of both the Hague Regulations, and AP I and AP II. Article 27 of the Hague 
Regulations states that civilian objects of a typically cultural value are not to be attacked 
(unless they are used for military purposes), and Article 25 provides a general 
prohibition of attack or bombardment of locations of a civilian nature.  
 
Whilst defining the terms ”civilians” and ”civilian population” in art. 50, AP I further 
elaborates in art. 51, setting out specific rules regarding the protection of the civilian 
population against military operations in armed conflict, and art. 52 on general protection 
of civilian objects. 
 
Any discussion of civilian direct participation in hostilities necessitates a clarification of 
the terms combatant and civilian; it is exactly the blurring of the line between these that 
poses a significant challenge in contemporary armed conflict. 
 
2.1 Civilians and combatants 
The principle of distinction is fundamental to any discussion of civilian participation in 
hostilities. The core in this regard is the clear and steadfast line between civilians and 
combatants. Article 43 (2) AP I provides a definition of ”combatant”: ”Members of the 
armed forces of a Party to the conflict [..] are combatants, that is to say, they have a 
right to participate directly in hostilities”. Conversely, a civilian (and members of the 
armed forces without combat privilege) does not have the privilege of combatancy and 
may be held accountable for participation in hostilities. 
 
The principle consequently entails that only combatants with combatant status have the 
right to participate in hostilities, whereas civilians have no such right. In armed conflict, 
this means that combatants have a de facto licence, albeit with the limitations posed by 
IHL, to kill without being subject to penal sanctions under relevant domestic criminal law. 
This is not the case for a civilian. However, a civilian cannot be targeted in armed 
conflict -  they are afforded protection in leges, with one caveat: if they participate 
directly in hostilities even though they have no such right, they will suffer a suspension of 
this protection for the duration of their participation. 
 
That a civilian does not have the right to participate directly in hostilities does not mean 
that such participation is prohibited under IHL; the consequences of such participation is 
not necessarily liability for war crimes, but it exposes the person in question to possible 
penal sanctions according to domestic law, since the acts may be considered crimes 
under such law. 
 
A number of the main challenges posed by modern warfare is brought to the forefront by 
both the NIAC becoming more prominent on a global scale, and the internationalisation 
of such conflict by alien states’ entry. Although this is, as shall be seen, problematic in 
that it creates confusion regarding status and the nature of actors’ participation, the 
principle of distinction – the obligation imposed on all participants in armed conflict to 
distinguish between combatant and civilian is something IHL dictates adherence to in all 
armed conflict. 
 
2.2 DPH analysis and combatancy status in NIACs 
While the formal status of combatancy is recognized in international armed conflict, its 
position in non-international armed conflict deserves special attention. At the diplomatic 
conference leading up to the two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, there 
was fervent disagreement regarding how combatancy should be treated in AP II, 
pertaining to NIACs. For political reasons, the end result was that AP II does not 
recognize combatant status per se, as this was deemed by many states as a recognition 
of rebel groups’ legitimacy, a hard thing to concede for states viewing such groups as 
mere criminals under various domestic laws.  
 Thus, the legal definition of ”combatant” found in AP I does not apply to non-international 
armed conflict. Combatancy in international armed conflict relates to combatant privilege 
and the right to prisoner-of-war status in case of capture by the adversary, whereas in a 
NIAC the term is by some used descriptively, denoting persons not enjoying civilian 
protection from attack. While AP I, applicable in IACs, states that the parties to the 
conflict shall distinguish between civilians and combatants, AP II, pertaining to NIACs, 
simply state that civilians shall not be the object of attack. The draught version of AP II, 
art. 24 (1) employed similar wording as the rule in AP I , but it was eventually omitted by 
vote. Notwithstanding the distinction between AP I and AP II on this point, the fact that 
AP I clearly stipulates that a principle of distinction is to be adhered to does not mean 
that such a principle is lacking in armed conflicts not of an international character. 
 
The distinction between DPH in international and non-international armed conflict is 
arguably not of the greatest practical interest, as the same evaluations pertain to DPH in 
both types of conflict. The main problem specific to NIACs with determining DPH lies not 
so much in what constitutes direct participation as in what constitutes hostilities for the 
purpose of DPH analysis. Mere internal disturbances and riots do not qualify as armed 
conflict and consequently lie outside the realm of IHL, and the line between such 
upheavals and armed conflict can indeed be hard to draw. Still, this is a question of what 
falls outside the scope of a DPH analysis, not a relevant issue in the analysis proper. 
 
The issue of combatancy being of some complexity in NIACs, what is most relevant for 
the purposes of this analysis is bearing in mind that non-State actors participating in 
hostilities in NIACs are civilians by status, and applying the term ”functional combatants” 
or ”fighters” to them does in no way imply legal combatant status. 
 
 
2.3 Threats to the principle of distinction 
In order to  ensure the protection of civilians in armed conflict, upholding the principle of 
distinction is vital; accordingly, elements disarraying the perspicuity of the line between 
civilian and combatant must be clarified lest the law of armed conflict become weakened 
through lack of coherence. This blurring of the line between stati is highly relevant to any 
discussion of civilian DPH, and if a clear distinction is getting increasingly difficult to 
uphold, this could undermine the protection afforded civilians in armed conflict; if 
combatants find themselves uncertain whence they may be attacked and by whom – 
coupled to the precariousness of whom they may in turn attack legally – the application 
of IHL in armed conflict will hardly propagate. A steadfast perception of who may be 
attacked and who is protected in armed conflict, and, hereunder, how civilian direct 
participation in hostilities is defined, is made increasingly difficult by a number of 
contemporary phenomena. 
2.3.1 Facets of modern armed conflict 
The four Geneva Conventions came into being after the two Word Wars had dominated 
the first half of the 20th century; this genus of armed conflict, in which wars are fought by 
sovereign states consisting of government, army and people, seems out of pace with 
what armed conflict looks like today. Contemporary conflicts often involve opposing 
armed groups and other non-state actors as well as state military forces. Moreover, the 
goal of some parties in contemporary conflict may very well not be final peace and 
stability, but a continuation of the turmoil for reasons specifically advantageous to that 
party or, in the case of many civil wars/internal conflicts, a goal seemingly indispensable 
to one party and intolerable to the other. 
 
The linearity of modern armed conflict is increasingly being perturbed, rendering 
distinction between legitimate military targets and protected elements often notoriously 
difficult. Specifically, the decline of the ”forward edge of the battle area”, or FEBA, and 
urbanisation of the battlescene greatly confuses such distinction. Additionally, shifting 
the battle closer to the civilian population may increase the risk of civilian participation, if 
for no other reason than greater incentive to do so brought forth by the proximity to the 
conflict. Thus, proximity to the FEBA is no longer so clear an indicator of DPH since the 
conflict has come to the civilian, and not the opposite.  
 
Another facet of modern armed conflict is technological asymmetry, with one party vastly 
superior technologically to the other. This involves the possibility of attacking and 
conducting military operations far from the battle area for one party, while the other has 
to apply far more rudimentary tactics. In such conflict, the distinction between legitimate 
military targets and protected persons can be difficult to assess, and requires further 
inspection as to what actually constitutes civilian DPH. 
2.3.2 Intermediate categories and expansion of the term ”combatant” 
In dealing with the threat of various armed – and more or less organized – groups, one 
has seen a developing practice of operating with a ”third category” in-between civilian 
and combatant status; this category encompasses so-called ”unlawful combatants”, 
denoting persons without combat privilege who have taken part in hostilities unlawfully. 
This is problematic in that it transgresses the fundamental line between civilian and 
combatant. A combatant, if captured by the adversary, has the right to POW status, 
endowing him with numerous rights, all of which are inexorable. A civilian, on the other 
hand, has no right to POW status, but enjoys a different set of rights, amongst others the 
right to fair hearing in the case of possible penal offences, and protection against 
unlawful internment. Applicable in IACs, AP I states that detained civilians (not to be 
charged with penal offences) shall generally be released ”with the minimum delay 
possible”. In the case of NIACs, both AP II and CA 3 lack specific provisions regulating 
such detention, but the Human Rights privilege of habeas corpus entails that a civilian 
will have the right to have a court of law determine the lawfulness of his detention. 
Consequently, he cannot be held indefinitely on instances of mere suspicion of penal 
offences, for instance. In light of this, the introduction of a ”third category” has created a 
class of persons lingering in a void with the detriments of both categories and the rights 
of none, perhaps reducing their protection below the minimum standard of human rights. 
One has noted the term ”unlawful combatants” more often than not applied to such 
persons. It cannot be underlined enough that the term ”unlawful combatancy” has no 
place in IHL; since participating in hostilities per se is not prohibited by IHL – IHL merely 
states that suspension of protection from attack is a consequence of DPH – the term has 
no relevance outside the realm of domestic penal law. Another variation of the term, 
”unprivileged belligerents” seems more appropriate for IHL application, since it relates to 
the fact that civilians do not have combatancy privilege. 
 Employing a third category of “unlawful combatants” as a legal status in IHL, alongside 
that of civilian and combatant, is under no circumstances legally acceptable. The same 
stance was taken de lege lata by the Israeli Supreme Court in PCATI v. Israel, and 
Melzer argues that such a category has no place in IHL, regarding it as belonging to the 
realm of domestic law and employing the term ”functional combatancy” for members of 
organized armed groups participating in hostilities. The ”functional combatancy” model is 
seen as not contrary to IHL because its proponents argue that it is a consequence of 
DPH, and  not an ad hoc, de lege ferenda classification. 
 
The existence of organized armed groups not belonging to a state and operating on their 
own accord in armed conflict is a quite present facet of modern armed conflict. The 
distinct faculties of what constitutes an army may also apply to such organisations, and 
defining how their members should be treated by the laws of armed conflict is becoming 
a pressing matter. Indeed, members of such organisations are civilians in the legal 
sense of the term, but treating them, in some cases, as combatants in practice seems 
increasingly rational in the climate of today’s armed conflicts. However, such treatment 
should not confuse the fact that although the law may treat such persons as combatants 
as a function of DPH, they are still civilians under IHL. 
3 Defining the term ”hostilities”  
For direct participation to entail suspension of protection from attack, it has to pertain to 
”hostilities”; the term is used uniformly in art. 51 (3) AP I, art. 13 (3) AP II and CA 3 (2). 
Direct participation in activities that does not constitute hostilities in the sense of these 
provisions will consequently fall outside the scope of DPH analysis. 
 
3.1 Delimitation of NIACs pertaining to internal disturbances and riots 
It is clear that ”hostilities” can only be conducted in the context of armed conflict for 
purposes of a DPH analysis. The threshold of application for CA 3 is armed conflict in 
State territory: ”[..] armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties [..]”. AP II sets the threshold higher in its 
art. 1 (1): ” [..] all armed conflict [not of an international character] which take place in 
the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed 
forces or other organized groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations and to implement this Protocol.” Moreover, art. 1 (2) AP II specifies 
that it shall not apply to internal disturbances and riots. Notwithstanding AP II’s high 
threshold of application, a qualification of ” hostilities” in the DPH sense of the term can 
also be based on CA 3. It is clear, however, that the ”armed conflict” of both CA 3 and 
AP II excludes internal disturbances, riots and sporadic acts of violence, and such 
situations can consequently never amount to ”hostilities”.  
 
3.2 Armed conflict, hostilities and attacks 
It is necessary to point out that hostilities is not equivalent to the concept of armed 
conflict, the former being narrower in scope than the latter. It has been pointed out, for 
instance, that a situation of ”armed conflict” can very well come into being and, indeed, 
be carried out without ever incurring any ”hostilities”, e.g. through a mere declaration of 
war or occupation of enemy territory without armed resistance, and a great deal of the 
law of armed conflict pertain to issues other than the conduct of hostilities. Common 
Article 2 to the GCs states that: ” [..] the present Convention shall apply to all cases of 
declared war [..]” and ”The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation [..] even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” The ICRC 
describes the dichotomy as ”It [the rules of the conduct of hostilities] essentially covers 
the conduct of military operations in armed conflict by defining proper and permissible 
uses of weapons and military tactics”. 
 
The notion of hostilities for DPH purposes should arguably be  wider than that of an 
attack, and narrower than ”armed conflict”. It has been described as ”actual prosecution 
of the armed conflict on behalf of the parties to the conflict”.  
 
AP I defines ”attacks” as ”[..] acts of violence against the enemy, whether in offence or 
defence”, providing a rather wide definition. The commentary elaborates, stating that the 
term has a wider denotation in the sense of IHL than it has in regular usage; the 
widening incorporates extending the term to cover defensive as well as offensive acts, 
and, moreover, acts such as the placing of mines and sabotage should be included as 
well. The commentary summarises these elements as ”attacks” denoting ”combat 
actions”. This definition of the term will be applicable in the ”hostilities” of the DPH rule.  
 
”Attacks” will also incorporate the time a participant conducts actions preparatory to 
participation. This notion is probably based on the temporal scope of a combatant’s 
obligation to distinguish himself from the civilian population, incorporating both while he 
is engaged in attack and military operations preparatory to such an attack. A civilian will 
consequently be participating in hostilities not only at the exact time of firing a weapon, 
but also from the time he takes up the weapon with the intention of participating in 
hostilities. 
 
It has been suggested that basing qualifications of DPH on such intention entails an 
undesirable complication of the DPH rule. Indeed, one author’s concept of hostilities – 
”activities which are designed to support on party to the conflict by harming another” – is 
essentially the definition of so-called belligerent nexus, a notion incorporating intent to a 
high degree. 
 
The material side of ”hostilities” in a DPH analysis should ideally be based on the 
feasible element of physical action and objective criteria rather than subjective elements 
like intent and design on the part of the civilian. The most obvious downside to such an 
approach is that it requires setting the threshold for ”hostilities” rather low, or, at least, 
rather lower than some authors would argue is sensible. However, providing a guideline 
pertaining to which situations civilians objectively should avoid participating in, do indeed 
seem more rational than exposing them to evaluations of intent in conjunction with a 
geographical element, if the aim of such a guideline is minimizing risk of illegitimate 
attacks on civilians. 
 
3.3 Models of the notion of ”hostilities” 
”Hostilities” being a composing element of DPH, it seems problematic that conventional 
IHL does not provide a definition of the term. With terms such as ”armed conflict”, 
”attack” and ”military operations” often used in a similar sense, the third ICRC expert 
meeting deemed a clarification useful. The following three ways of interpreting the notion 
of hostilities for the purposes of DPH analysis were suggested. 
 
3.3.1 Acts adversely affecting the enemy 
According to this model, hostilities should be interpreted as to denote ”all acts that 
adversely affect or aim to adversely affect the enemy’s pursuance of its military objective 
or goal”. This definition is rooted in the principle of distinction in that it employs the 
essential aspects of combatancy privilege to delimit the extension of lawful civilian 
behaviour in such conflict. The interpretation was criticised on the grounds that, while 
perhaps being useful for regulating which objects may be attacked, for making such a 
determination regarding persons it is perhaps less suited, since targeting of persons 
should be “subject to a more restrictive regime than the targeting of objects”. Art. 57 (2) 
lit. a (ii) AP I, addressing precautions in attack, lists ”civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects” in what seems a hierarchical structure indicating that 
preserving civilian life requires more precaution in the conduct of military operations than 
does preserving civilian objects. The same structure can be found in art. 57 (1) AP I, 
listing civilian objects last. Thus the notion that targeting of persons is subject to a more 
restrictive regime than the targeting of objects has foundation in treaty wording. In light 
of this, the interpretation of hostilities offered here may seem too wide, since it does not 
necessarily distinguish between persons and objects. 
 
 
3.3.2 Acts directed against the enemy 
”All military activities directed against the enemy in an armed conflict”, is the wording of 
the second expert proposal. The obvious interpretational difficulties in using the term 
”military activities” was pointed out by several experts regarding this definition, and 
indeed the usage of the ambiguous term ”military. A proposed solution would be to 
replace this term with ”hostile activities” or merely ”activities”, resulting in the ambiguous 
construction ”activities directed against the enemy in an armed conflict”. The expert 
proposing the definition clarified that ”activities” here would denote acts broader in scope 
that ”combat”, but much more narrow than ”contribution to the war effort”. 
 
3.3.3 Zone of hostilities 
The third specific proposal for a definition of the term ”hostilities” in a DPH sense was 
based on the concept of simplifying its application by doing away with on-the-run 
evaluations. The idea was seemingly to combine a narrow interpretation of ”hostilities” 
with a geographical element, thus forming a ”zone of hostilities”. The thought is clearly to 
”simplify the operation of the principle of distinction”, something the proposal admittedly 
would entail. However, it effectively does away with the entire concept of this principle in 
a specified geographical zone, perhaps making it incompatible with IHL itself. At the very 
least, the legality of such a construction seems dubious, and it may indeed be contrary 
to the spirit of arts. 51 AP I and 13 AP II pertaining to protection of the civilian 
population. Moreover, the application of such a zone of hostilities would in practice only 
be feasible in situations where combat operations are geographically far removed from 
locations populated by civilians, rendering it useless in a number of today’s armed 
conflicts. Battlefield proximity is already regarded as an element of DPH analysis; so the 
concept of a zone of hostilities does seem extraneous. 
 
3.4 Resulting concept of ”hostilities” for the purpose of DPH analysis 
Opinions of how “hostilities” should be interpreted as a constitutive element of DPH are 
many, and the issue is heavily debated. Only a few elements seem to crystallise as 
possible to assess firmly. Notwithstanding interpretations of “hostilities” such as the ones 
discussed above, it seems clear that the term, for the purposes of DPH analysis, should 
be construed more narrowly than the concept of ”armed conflict”, and wider than 
”attacks”. In short, hostilities probably should be interpreted to include acts of violence 
apparently directed against one party to the conflict. Setting up a compulsory 
requirement of ”design”, both regarding the intent of harm of the act in question and the 
stipulation that the act should support the other party to the conflict seems implausible 
for practical application; one could very well require that such may seem to be the case 
and the act should be immediately construed  like this ”on-the-fly” (and then with a 
rather low threshold), but requiring a full certainty of hostile intent does not seem 
particularly enlightening as clarification of the term ”hostilities” for military personnel 
engaged in combat operations.  
 
In the context of sporadic and individual participation, a definition of ”hostilities” strictly 
requiring extensive deliberations of subjective intent seems more appropriate for 
purposes of domestic legal persecution for participation in hostilities than real-time 
targeting decisions. Moreover, in such cases, a combatant will often be able to target a 
civilian on the basis of a right to self defence.  
 
In the case of civilians habitually and continuously taking a direct part in hostilities, in 
reality functioning as combatants, it may seem counter-intuitive to grant such persons 
civilian protection in-between instances of their participation. Consequently, more 
elaborate cogitations pertaining to hostile intent as a requirement for determining 
instances of “hostilities” are plausible due to a less pressed temporal situation in such 
cases. 
4 Direct participation 
4.1 Initial remarks 
As noted, the main rule regarding DPH, found in arts. 51 (3) AP I, 13 (3) AP II and CA 3 
to the GCs, is that civilians are protected from attack, but suffer a suspension of this 
protection if they take a direct part in hostilities, for the duration of each specific act 
amounting to direct participation. The reasoning behind this focal part of humanitarian 
law is found in the divide between civilian and combatant, and the recognition that, whilst 
in need of special protection in times of armed conflicts, civilians taking part in hostilities 
merit no such protection. 
 
The rule was first laid out in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
employing the term ”persons taking no active part in the hostilities”. It was conspicuously 
adopted in both Additional Protocols, with the phrasing ”take a direct part”. The semantic 
difference is of no interpratory interest, and should be taken to denote the same 
concept. The French texts, moreover, employs the term participent directement in both 
instances.  
 
While the DPH rule seems textually uncomplicated, neither the Geneva Conventions nor 
its Additional Protocols provides express definition of the term, and no clear guidelines 
as to its interpretation. The result has been a series of diverse interpretations who may 
be too wide or to narrow, either allowing arbitrary targeting of civilians or leading to 
civilian exploitation of their protected status. Both these alternatives are not satisfactory 
regarding preserving the underlying principle of distinction in practice. Clarifying what 
DPH is becomes vastly important in light of this. A clarification should comprise both 
plausible practical application in armed conflict, and be in line with the general purpose 
of IHL. Moreover, a clarification should ”encompass(..) the modern spectrum of civilian 
activities” in light of the increased use of civilians performing work of a military nature. 
 
4.2 Systematic approaches to direct participation 
For purposes of clarification, systemising approaches to what constitutes direct 
participation in hostilities into a restrictive and a liberal view seems rational, as it will help 
in illustrating the difference between direct and indirect participation in hostilities. 
 
Melzer systemises the substantive scope of the notion of DPH in two main categories, 
and Schmitt suggests a liberal approach as opposed to a more restrictive one, 
expressing the same categorization. There seems to be two main aspects of a liberal 
view on direct participation: a membership, or “functional combatancy” model, and a 
method based on an extensive textual interpretation of “direct”. These approaches, 
discussed below, are discernable interpretations often seen in analysis of DPH.  
 
4.2.1 Restrictive approach 
A restrictive approach to determining direct participation seems based on restricting the 
concept of DPH to acts representing an actual and immediate military threat to a party to 
the conflict. The view is that a civilian has to engage in a specific attack for his behaviour 
to qualify as DPH, thus  interlocking the act with the term ”hostilities” in a strict textual 
interpretation. 
 
The entire concept of such an restrictive approach rests on case-specific evaluations; it 
looks to individuals and their individual acts and determines whether these acts 
constitute DPH. If a civilian spontaneously and individually picks up his rifle at his  home 
and goes out shooting at combatants, this would be one singular instance of DPH. 
Viewing DPH in such a strict textually bound manner leaves less room for complex 
evaluations than a more liberal textual interpretation would, since such situations would 
usually be tangible and easily recognized. 
4.2.2 Functional combatancy and membership models 
The so-called membership approach springs out of the notion of functional combatancy, 
namely a civilian position that resembles that of a combatant to such a degree that his 
behaviour is seen as a continuous direct participation in hostilities. Although still 
civilians, according to the membership model the law should treat such individuals as 
combatants, and consequently they can be attacked legitimately continually and not 
merely at the instance of a specific act.  
 
This involves looking to see whether the conduct in reality corresponds to that of State 
armed forces; this can incorporate planning, logistics, recruiting and so forth, the point 
being that if a civilian functions as a combatant – or, rather, the activities of the group of 
which he is a member are of a military essence generally,  he will suffer suspension of 
civilian protection as mere membership is deemed a continuous participation. This 
approach is widely used in practice in dealing with armed groups of various natures, and 
its birth is often seen as a result of such groups’ increasingly significant role in modern 
armed conflict, be it international or non-international. The rationale behind it seems to 
be chiefly practical and it provides solution to the problem of how to deal with civilians in 
reality functioning as combatants. The arguments against such a functional approach 
seem twofold: 
 
1. It effectively suspends civilian protection of a number of persons permanently. 
Since this arguably could constitute a violation of the principle of distinction, the 
threshold for deeming a civilian ”functional combatant” should indeed be set very 
high. Setting such a threshold intrinsically implies a certain degree of 
tentativeness, and with it, a rather large margin of error. Mistakenly applying the 
term to and being able to legitimally target civilians poses clear problems, as it 
could lead to State killing of innocent civilians. 
 
2. The second main problem with a functional combatancy approach is which 
functions in an organized armed group are to be covered. Indeed, there are 
members of State armed forces without combatant privilege, thus applying 
”functional combatancy” to all members of such armed groups may seem 
dubious. It is, however, clear that this interpretation is promulgated by some: ”Our 
[the Israeli Defence Forces] view is that anyone involved with terrorism within 
Hamas is a valid target. This ranges from the strictly military institutions and 
includes the political institutions that provide the logistical funding and human 
resources for the terrorist arm”. Pertaining to this statement, it was opined that 
”Once you extend the definition of combatant in the way the IDF [Israeli Defence 
Forces] is apparently doing, you begin to associate individuals who are only 
indirectly or peripherally involved [..]” [emphasis added].  Indeed, one should 
bear in mind that a militarylike armed group may consist of drivers, cooks, remote 
financial supporters and other such elements never engaged in combat. One 
author argues that classifying different functions performed by members of such 
groups for the purposes of determining DPH is indeed rational, and members 
whose function does not approximate that of a combatant should not suffer 
permanent suspension of protection. This argument can seem convincing when 
seen in conjunction with non-combatant members of State armed forces having 
protected status. Still, and in line with Schmitt’s views, there should be some 
substance to the argument that civilians’ voluntary affiliation with such groups 
hardly merits the protections IHL affords non-participating civilians. Firstly, it can 
be questioned whether it is possible to have a clear non-combatant function in the 
context of membership in such groups. Secondly, one could argue that becoming 
a member in an organised armed group involves taking an active decision and 
one should not expect being protected as a civilian as a consequence. Regarded 
in conjunction with the inherent complication of providing useful intelligence as to 
groups members’ positions within the group, the notion of group membership 
generally equalling functional combatancy, leading to permanent loss of civilian 
protection does seem of some merit if one accepts such an interpretation of the 
DPH rule as sound. 
 
At the second ICRC meeting, it was also pointed out that introduction of a membership 
model would entail an extension of the DPH notion clearly not in line with what was 
originally intended at the Diplomatic Conference in 1974-1977, and that such an 
introduction probably would diminish civilian protection generally.  
 
Furthermore, if such a category is to be introduced, the problem of qualification - 
regarding what the criteria for applying the model to a certain group should be – will 
become sensitive indeed, since it will effectively strip civilian protection from the persons 
it affects, the threshold for which arguably should be set very high. 
 
4.2.3 Extensive textual interpretation of direct 
This point of view is based on extending the term ”direct participation” to include, to 
various degrees, activities that, while not of a directly military nature necessarily, 
contribute in some manner or other to the general war effort. Civilians could, for 
instance, be working in a munitions factory that is clearly a legitimate military target. 
From a restrictive point of view, such work does not constitute DPH – chiefly because 
there is no sufficiently causal link between the work and (possible) harm inflicted by it. 
However, one could argue that since such work does in fact contribute in a direct 
manner to the war effort, albeit not to the act of shooting itself, it could qualify as DPH. 
This is indeed a very radical thought, especially considering that such an approach 
would effectively legitimize targeting a very large number of civilians, breaking heavily 
with the main purpose behind and essence of IHL. Furthermore, one could argue that 
most work done by civilians in times of armed conflict in some way or another  
contributes to the general war effort, and drawing the line between what contributes to 
the war effort sufficiently to be deemed DPH and what contributes more indirectly and 
thus does not entail DPH is practically impossible. Such an extensive interpretation, 
moreover, has little support among authors, and is contrary to State practice as well. 
 
4.3 Emerging criteria for constituting DPH 
Some criteria are constantly resurfacing in discussions of what amounts to direct 
participation in hostilities. One can organise them as three cumulative elements: a 
threshold of harm, a requirement of causality between the act and the harm, and 
so-called belligerent nexus. 
 
4.3.1 Threshold of harm 
This criterion implies that the act in question must detrimentally affect the military 
operations or capacity of a party to the conflict, or is likely to do so. Plausibly, it may be 
deduced from the direct of the DPH rule; if an act does not have any inherent danger at 
all, it seems groundless to tag it as direct participation since combatants would not have 
any interest in addressing it, and it would not have any relevance regarding the reasons 
for implementing a  DPH rule in IHL. The  ICRC commentary on AP I states that: ”[..] 
”direct” participation means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to 
cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces”.  
 
Spitting at an enemy armoured vehicle obviously does not have such damage potential 
and will not qualify, but launching an RPG towards it clearly will. Throwing a rock at such 
a vehicle is more of a dubious question. If it agitates or leads other civilians to start 
similar hostile acts thereby in reality increasing its damage potential, it could 
approximate the threshold of harm. Such an indirect application of the criterion is 
however dubious, chiefly on account of it being extremely impractical in real combat 
situations. But by the same argument, it could very well be rational to place it on the 
excessive side of the threshold of harm; if combatants find themselves bombarded by an 
incomprehensible melange of less sophisticated weapons and ordnance proper, they 
can hardly be expected to make elaborate calculations of who is legitimate targets 
among the assailants. 
 
The Threshold of Harm-criterion is also exceeded if the act in question inflicts or is likely 
to inflict death or damage to civilians and civilian objects not under the control of the 
attacker. If acts of violence directed toward military forces has the potential of harming 
other civilians but not the military forces, the threshold of harm will be exceeded. 
 
4.3.2 Direct causation of harm 
The second criterion states that there must be a direct causal link between the act in 
question and the harm likely to result (on either military objectives or civilian objects). 
The ICRC Commentary on AP I states that  there should be a ”direct causal relationship 
between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the 
place where the activity takes place” [emphasis added] The Commentary on AP II 
expresses the same notion: ”[DPH] implies that there is a sufficient causal relationship 
between the act of participation and its immediate consequences” [emphasis added]. 
While the semantic difference between ”direct causal relationship” and ”sufficient causal 
relationship” is distinct, there is nothing that suggests this criterion being applied more 
restrictively in an IAC than in a NIAC, as the wording would seem to indicate. The 
wording of the AP II Commentary seems preferable though, ”sufficient” pertaining to 
adequacy rather than the unambiguity of ”direct”, the former more properly fitting to 
actual evaluations during armed conflict than the latter’s theoretic prerequisites. 
 
Melzer adheres to the criterion of direct causation, but amalgamates it with the threshold 
of harm; indeed, in instances of combat, it seems difficult to argue that viewing them as 
distinctly separate is practical or of any value in clarifying what DPH entails. The 
purpose of assessing DPH accurately is to ensure that civilian protection be upheld in 
armed conflict, and looking first to see if an act has damage potential, for then to 
consider whether or not this potential would be causally linked to a damage that may 
occur, could perhaps seem stilted in some situations.  
 
4.3.3 Belligerent Nexus 
The concept of belligerent nexus has been a much discussed element of DPH analysis, 
without springing from treaty text directly. Its propagators see it as derived from the term 
”direct” in the DPH rule. It involves that for an act to qualify as DPH, it needs to have a 
nexus to a situation of hostilities; lack of such nexus will according to this criterion not 
result in suspension of protection. Preceptively, the act needs to be designed to support 
one party to the conflict by harming another. As such, harming a combatant with the 
purpose of mere robbery, for instance, would not qualify as direct participation in this 
context since there is no belligerent nexus to an instance of hostilities, even though the 
act is both obviously inflicting harm on military personnel and there is clear causation 
between the act and the harm inflicted.  
 
A pointed critique of the requirement of belligerent nexus is that it involves establishing 
subjective intent on the part of the civilian, and defining and applying such hostile intent 
in actual armed combat can be fraught with difficulty. It is worth pointing out, though, that 
belligerent nexus and hostile intent are not synonymous; hostile intent is an intrinsic part 
and condition of belligerent nexus, but the intent needs to be directly linked to an 
instance of hostilities in order to constitute belligerent nexus. 
 
The Respondents in PCATI v. Israel held that such intent could very well be employed 
as a criteria for constituting DPH, and this stance was also taken by several experts at 
the second ICRC meeting, even suggesting it as a theoretically superior way of 
determining DPH, albeit difficult and clearly inferior to an objective approach in actual 
combat operations. However, some experts held that coupling the intent criterion with 
the nexus of a specific act to armed conflict could provide a useful indicator of direct 
participation in such operations, and this does probably constitutes a practical value 
proper in situations other than retrospective analysis, arguably leading to the conclusion 
that belligerent nexus should only be construed as a potential guideline in determining 
DPH. If belligerent nexus is to be seen as a required criterion, it should probably suffice 
to see its existence as probable with the information available at the time, although even 
such application seems of dubious value considering its abstract nature and the fact that 
a determination of belligerent nexus may often be no more than conjecture on the part of 
the combatant. Belligerent nexus is perhaps better suited as a guideline than as a 
criterion in determining DPH. 
4.4 Clarifying direct participation facilitated by sub-division of civilians 
Generally, whilst discussing civilians functioning as combatants, it should be underlined 
that one is looking to their actions, and whatever these may be, they are not deprived of 
the legal status of civilian. If one distinguishes between civilians affiliated with armed 
groups on the one hand, and civilians with no such connection on the other, a 
conclusion that some civilians may be treated as combatants in practice will be a 
consequence of their membership in such groups, and a function of the DPH analysis. 
 
Sub-division of civilians hinges on functional combatancy and the membership models 
discussed above. If one approaches the problem of DPH with such a sub-division, the 
definition of ”direct” will necessarily vary between the categories of civilians. On the one 
hand, there will be ”functional combatants”, that is, civilians whose conduct 
approximates that of a combatant to such a degree that suspension of protection from 
direct targeting will be permanent. On the other, there will be ”civilians” in the traditional 
IHL sense of the term. 
 
Whether pertaining to membership in a larger group of military essence, being a part of 
a smaller cabal of fighters or merely acting alone, functional combatancy with permanent 
loss of protection is plausible, although debated. One could argue in favour of a 
requirement of specific group membership for constituting permanent loss of protection, 
since the notion of the membership model is founded on a group’s military essence and 
not solely the conduct of the individual civilian. But if such individual conduct outside the 
context of group membership amounts to continuous and unambiguous direct 
participation, it would seem unreasonable if deprivation of civilian protection could only 
be applied based on membership status, which will invariably include quite various 
degrees of participation, along with the problems of classification this entails. 
 
Admittedly, since civilians participating on a continuous basis as often as not will be 
connected to, in various forms, armed groups of disparate proportions, the notion of the 
continually participating civilian acting alone is not the most practically applicable. 
However, it serves to underline that it should probably be individually continuous 
participation in itself that forms the basis for constituting permanent loss of protection, 
and not affiliation with a myriad of groups notoriously difficult to classify. This seems 
most in line with the wording and intention behind arts. 51 (3) AP I and 13 (3) AP II – 
”civilians” here should be taken to denote individual civilians.  
 
The reasoning behind a sub-division of civilians is arguably facilitation of constituting 
DPH, and avoiding so-called ”revolving door” problems, namely  situations in which a 
civilian can opt in and out of hostilities, retaining his immunity whilst not engaged in 
actual combat operations.   
 
4.5 Resulting concept of direct vs. indirect participation 
It seems clear that activities with no potential of inflicting harm can never constitute 
direct participation in hostilities. It would be too wide an interpretation of ”direct” to 
include, for example, negligible acts intended merely as statements with no damage 
potential whatsoever. Were one to include such acts in the definition of ”direct 
participation”, it would entail a danger to the civilian population going against the 
intention of IHL.  
 
Further, acts with no direct damage potential due to their remoteness are excluded, the 
harm potential of an act should be direct and immediate. Extending this principle would 
both create immense problems of quantification of harm potential and effectively include 
numerous civilian activities in times of armed conflict that, while indirectly supporting one 
party to the conflict by indirectly harming another, for example working in a munitions 
factory or producing war rations for combatants, are too distant from actual combat to 
qualify as DPH. Moreover, the number of civilians participating directly if one were to 
include such activities would be vast, also indicating that such an approach would be 
contrary to the paradigm of civilian protection inherent in IHL. 
  
The notorious example of a civilian truck driver working in a situation of armed conflict 
can serve to illustrate these points. Driving Easter bunnies in time for holiday 
celebrations to the front lines in a situation of battle does not constitute DPH and he 
cannot be targeted directly. The act itself has no inherent damage potential. Driving 
ammunition, though, would arguably constitute DPH, since the directness of the act and 
the damage potential is causally linked. However, driving ammunition not to the front 
lines but to a ammunitions depot, would probably not. The reason is that the lack of 
causality between the act and the consequence; notwithstanding the fact that driving 
ammunition can qualify as an act with sufficient damage potential to qualify as DPH, if 
not driven to the actual scene of combat, the link between providing ammunition and 
thus inflicting harm seems too distant for constituting direct participation.  
 
An interesting and indeed relevant issue is monetary funding of activities constituting 
DPH, prominently in the context of armed groups, and  whether such funding itself fall 
within the scope of the DPH rule. Assuming it would, the ”direct” wording in this rule 
indicates that such funding would have to involve it being directly related to instances of 
DPH. The threshold for such directness should then be the check.  
 
Allocation of funds to a organised armed group in a general budget not particularly 
pertaining to such groups, for instance government allocation of money, should not 
qualify because of its remoteness. On the other hand, an instance of direct funding of 
weapons purchased for the purpose of participating in hostilities arguably would. 
Activities performed to acquire such money is more dubious. If the aim of the activity is 
to fund and facilitate DPH directly, and solely designed for such a purpose, it may 
constitute DPH itself. It has been assessed that, for instance, some of Al-Qaida’s funds 
originate from complex fundraising networks specifically designed for supporting this 
group. Organising such networks would be proximate to acts constituting DPH in such a 
way that it seems viable to argue it entails an instance of DPH in itself. 
 
Technological advances have also brought forth instances of acts that could be said 
constituting DPH. For example, use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be 
considered here. If operated by civilians and used to engage targets, the operators 
would be directly involved in such a manner that proximity to the battlefield plausibly 
becomes irrelevant. It seems difficult to argue that such operation could in any way be 
indirectly linked to the instance of hostilities it pertains to. However, performing 
maintenance on UAVs employed in such a manner would probably not qualify as direct. 
The connection to the shooting is likely too remote; there is an insufficient causal link 
between the act and the harm. Installing its weapons systems is less clearly defined.  
The harm potential of the act is strictly speaking equivalent to that of operating the UAV, 
and no less critical for its purpose. Indeed, Schmitt has proposed a test for determining 
DPH consisting of assessing the criticality of the act to the direct application of violence 
against the enemy. He argues that an act is direct participation if the civilian can foresee 
that his action will harm or disadvantage the enemy in a relatively direct and immediate 
way, and exemplifies the line between direct and indirect participation here by stating 
that flightline aircraft maintenance personnel are participating directly, whereas 
depot-level workers are not. Harmonising with this view, then, installing weapons 
systems in UAVs would constitute direct participation, but general maintenance due to 
wear would not. 
. 
Additionally, there is the notion of ”belligerent nexus”. It dictates that an act must be 
designed to harm one party to the conflict and consequently supporting another. One 
author includes this criterion quite distinctly in his definition of DPH. Arguably, this does 
not seem like a productive element in constituting DPH, leading more to lack of clarity 
than elucidation. From a practically oriented standpoint, determining subjective intent on 
the part of a civilian presumably engaged in DPH and setting such intent as a 
requirement for being able to target him or her directly appears less than realistic. It 
should be sufficient that the act appears to be designed for such purposes, an 
evaluation that should adhere to the standard of what a reasonable combatant normally 
would perceive the situation to be with the information available to him at the time. 
5 Temporal scope of direct participation in hostilities 
Additional Protocol I dictates that the loss of protection occurring when civilians 
participate directly in hostilities is temporary in nature - the relevant wording is the ”for 
such time” verbiage in arts. 51 (3) AP I and 13 (3) AP II -  and thus merely a 
suspension, but it does not provide any guidelines as to the scope of this suspension. 
Indeed, it merely states that their protection is suspended ”for such time” as they 
participate. A civilian can be, then, a valid military target exclusively in the interval 
between the start and end of his or her engagement in what amounts to direct 
participation, and determining the temporal scope of this participation is consequently 
vital. It is worth noting that the notion of one instance of DPH being temporally equal to 
the  suspension of protection it induces is heavily supported by legal scholars 
 
5.1 The problem of the ”revolving door” 
The so-called ”problem of the revolving door” refers to the fact that a civilian may, under 
IHL, participate in hostilities and clearly suffer suspension of protection during this 
participation, but subsequently regain civilian protection after his actions no longer 
constitute DPH; the possibility of opting in and out of hostilities continuously with all the 
protection afforded him under IHL is often seen as intuitively unjust. The problem is often 
described as farmer by day, guerrilla by night and similar constructions.  
 
Pertaining to civilians who are members of guerrilla fractions or armed groups of a 
military essence, the revolving door problem is often circumvented by regarding such 
persons as ”functional combatants”, their continuous participation forming grounds for 
loss of protection on a permanent basis and thus disqualifying them from benefiting from 
such a ”door”. Melzer opines such a restricted version of the ”revolving door” and argues 
that, since only civilians who participate directly in hostilities on an unorganized and 
sporadic basis will be able to benefit from a revolving door of protection, a tolerance of a 
revolving door problem is an acceptable price to pay, since a more liberal approach – 
referring to extending the notion of ”for such time” beyond the plausible temporal 
demarcations of DPH – would entail significant danger for the general civilian population. 
One author seems to disagree with both Melzer’s view and the general view of the ICRC 
meetings, arguing that a revolving door of protection is not acceptable even with regard 
to civilians who only participate sporadically and are not members of an armed group. 
Where Melzer holds that only DPH of a continuous nature based on a membership 
model would be exempt from revolving door protection, Schmitt suggests that recurring, 
or, indeed, merely a single act of, direct participation could be sufficient for emaciating 
the notion of a revolving door. The rationale is that this should clarify DPH for 
combatants, and graft incentive to stay out of armed conflict on to the civilian population: 
”If civilians could repeatedly opt in and out of hostilities, combatants victimized by their 
activities would quickly loose respect for the law, thereby exposing the civilian population 
as a whole to greater danger. Moreover, the greater their susceptibility to attack, the 
greater their incentive to stay out of the conflict. [..] Once an individual has opted into 
hostilities, he or she remains a valid military objective until unambiguously opting out”. 
Such opting out can take the form of ”extended non-participation or an affirmative act of 
withdrawal”. It is hard to read this as anything else than a requirement that a civilian who 
have participated in hostilities, albeit only in one instance, suffer suspension of 
protection in temporal proximity to the act extending beyond that of actual participation. 
At the third ICRC meeting, it was pointed out that the duration of an instance of DPH 
was equal to the duration of the ensuing loss of protection, so the ”until-opting-out” 
approach above would, the Meeting opinion considered, necessarily entail extending an 
instance of DPH far beyond a singular act of DPH to accommodate such a protracted 
temporal scope.  
 
How extended the civilian’s non-participation should be for protection to be reinstigated 
would in this case be an acutely arduous appraisal, perhaps not making such a 
requirement well suited for clarification purposes.  
 
5.2 Varying approaches to the temporal scope of DPH 
The treatment of the temporal scope of DPH was one of the main debated issues at the 
2005 ICRC expert meeting, and underlined as ”[..]one of the most important issues to be 
clarified[..]”. The deliberations were based on two main premises; 1: that the duration of 
one instance of DPH is equal to the ensuing suspension, and that 2: the revolving door 
as a legal mechanism is inevitable. There were three main approaches to the temporal 
problem; together they serve the purpose of pointing out the main problems of the 
temporal scope of DPH quite well. 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Specific acts 
The ”specific acts approach” is based on the idea that the duration of one instance of 
DPH is equal to the duration of the suspension of protection it triggers. Thus it 
demonstrably is the result of a strict textual interpretation of the ”for such time” verbiage. 
The main advantage to such an approach lies in its simplicity; civilians can only be 
attacked when they participate directly in hostilities, not after or before such 
participation. Even considering the debate of what should constitute DPH, one can 
hardly set a more tangible guideline. 
 
The main problem with this approach is clearly the existence of recurrently participating 
civilians, ranging from participation in a few instances, via habitual participation, to 
downright functional combatancy – carried out by both individuals acting more or less 
alone, or members of armed groups and militias. In all these cases, the revolving door 
problem will be manifest if the temporal nature of DPH is solely to be based on a specific 
acts approach, and it does indeed seem difficult to argue that a civilian engaged in 
combat operations on a regular basis does not pose a military threat because he is 
home in bed. Consequently, if one does not accept a ”revolving door” for such 
participants, this approach is left regulating only a small number of instances of DPH, 
”[..] less than one percent of the targeting decisions taken during an armed conflict [..]”, 
since the majority of such decisions apply to functional combatants, or, at least, civilians 
participating in hostilities on a regular basis. Moreover, the marginal application a 
specific acts approach would probably pertain to cases where the use of lethal force 
could be justified by the right to self-defence, rendering the whole concept of such an 
approach nugatory but for theoretical purposes.  
 
One expert at the Meeting suggested that the deficiencies of the ”specific acts approach” 
be addressed by combining the approach with an extensive interpretation of ”hostilities”.  
Its strength would be augmented if one extended the notion of ”hostilities” to include 
direct planning, logistical support, deployment to and return from the scene of action, 
and similar elements. The impediment to this view is ostensibly that the practical value 
of such an approach is deprecated by adding prerequisite evaluations regarding 
”hostilities” in each individual case prior to a decision of targeting. 
 
5.2.2 Affirmative disengagement 
The ”affirmative disengagement” approach entails that suspension of protection from 
attack as a result of DPH will last until there is a declaration of some sort announcing the 
civilian’s withdrawal from the hostilities. The disengagement should be objectively 
recognisable to the adversary, but can consist of both an affirmative act or verbal 
declaration, or extended non-participation. In the case of membership in an armed 
group, a declaration of withdrawal and indeed extended non-participation seems 
plausibly applicable criteria for practical purposes; however, this is more contentious in 
the case of individual civilians participating on a sporadic and non-organised basis. 
Questions have been raised regarding how practical it is in the context of    ”[..]the 
de-personalized reality of modern warfare[..]” to convey individual declarations of 
disengagement, and such questions are indeed of some weight; the feasibility of 
keeping track of each civilian who have participated directly in hostilities’ status of 
participation seems of an incalculable nature, although the stipulation of an affirmative 
act of withdrawal does provide ”jamming of the revolving door”, as Schmitt puts it.  
 
Although today’s armed conflicts may involve civilian participation in such large numbers 
that one can argue them ”de-personalised”, the existence of individuals prominently 
visible by virtue of intelligence operations or, indeed,  their own acts, is undeniably 
worth considering as well. Such individuals may very well be easily able to declare 
affirmative disengagement. Consequently, whilst technological advances and prominent 
civilian presence arguably could amount to ”de-personalisation” of armed conflict, by the 
same token modern combat could be said to have a distinct ”personalised” aspect as 
well. A view that affirmative disengagement is too difficult to declare in today’s armed 
conflicts for this to be a reasonable approach in determining the temporal scope of DPH 
should probably not be based on an argument of ”de-personalisation”. Many civilians 
could have better possibilities of declaring disengagement by virtue of technological 
advances; modern intelligence efficiency and evolving communication channels such as 
the Internet will hardly be a hindrance in this respect. 
 
5.2.3 Membership model 
The so-called ”membership model” is a combination of a specific acts approach and an 
affirmative disengagement approach, and seems developed mainly for addressing the 
shortcomings of these. The idea is, that whilst a specific acts approach is rational when 
it comes to regulating the temporal aspect of DPH pertaining to civilians participating on 
a sporadic basis, for continuously participating persons it is not. Conversely, the 
affirmative acts approach does not seem particularly well suited to the former because of 
the inherent difficulties such an individual will face in order to provide a declaration of 
disengagement, whereas it does ostensibly hold more merit applied to the latter, partly 
because such participation, one could argue, is of a nature not deserving the protection 
of the law, but also because members of armed groups will arguably be in a position to 
more easily provide a disengagement declaration. 
 
Hence, in order to tailor the solution to DPH’s temporal problem to different civilian 
participation levels, the membership model combines the two former models: the 
specific acts approach regarding civilians participating spontaneously and singularly, 
and the affirmative disengagement model pertaining to members of armed groups. This 
model is also the one Israel’s Supreme Court asserts in PCATI v. Israel, although the 
Court does imply that some degree of detachment from a previous instance of 
participation should be required even for a civilian participating sporadically. This is a 
subtle distinction from the membership model of the ICRC Meeting and Melzer, but vital 
none the less. The Court opines that ” a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities one 
single time, or sporadically, who later detaches himself from that activity [..] is entitled to 
protection from attack”. This does not seem as an assertion of an affirmative 
disengagement model directly, since it is very unclear what the word ”detaches” would 
denote here; while it could entail an expanse of suspension of protection beyond the 
duration of a specific act, the wording is devoid of a requirement that a detachment be 
objectively recognisable for the adversary. 
 
5.3 Clarifying ”for such time” 
It should seem clear, then, that neither a specific acts approach nor an affirmative 
disengagement model are suited for clarifying the temporal aspect of DPH. Because of 
the different levels of civilian participation, ranging from one-time spontaneous actions to 
planned and coordinated attacks performed by members of armed groups of a military 
essence, it is difficult asserting one definitive guideline that would embrace all instances 
efficiently and for the proper implementation of IHL values. 
 
If one presumes that the best possible protection of the general civilian population 
coupled with the possibility for military forces to conduct their operations effectively is the 
goal, it appears difficult to ignore an approach based on treating different categories of 
civilians separately. 
 
This, then, entails distinguishing between two main groups of civilians, namely persons 
functioning as combatants and the rest. The former would be seen as functional 
combatants and thus a legitimate military target permanently (or until they have 
disengaged). The latter is afforded civilian protection and can only be attacked whilst 
participating directly in hostilities. 
 
Regarding the legal implementation of a such a distinction, it worth pointing  out that it 
should be based on an interpretation of the DPH rule, encompassing group membership 
in itself, thus founding group members’ permanent suspension of protection on treaty 
wording instead of merely extending the notion of combatancy to include such members.  
 
Temporally, both alternatives would lead to the same result, both propitiating a military 
need to address the revolving door problem. However, the former method, deducing the 
notion of continuous participation from the “for such time” of the treaty wording, does 
perhaps stand as better legal reasoning in that it does not necessitate a more or less 
dubious extension of the combatancy term.  
 
With permanent suspension of protection applying to members of armed groups or 
”functional combatants”, the question of how one should treat spontaneous and 
un-organised DPH temporally remains. The answer is conceivably that one should rely 
on a strict textual interpretation of ”for such time”. Extending it may entail danger to the 
general civilian population by leading to confusion as to who may be attacked 
legitimately in armed conflict. The consequence of a strict interpretation will necessarily 
be that one has to accept certain instances of a revolving door of protection, since 
sporadic and unorganised DPH will entail suspension of protection for the duration of 
one instance of participation. 
 
Dividing the temporal scope of DPH in two classes does bring about certain 
complications. For the ”membership class”, the problem lies in the questionable legality 
of continuously being able to target individuals that are in fact civilians by legal status. 
For the ”spontaneous DPH class” the main caveat is that one has to accept a small 
revolving door of protection. However, both have – owing to their relative simplicity – the 
advantage of being practically plausible in a situation of armed conflict. Consequently, 
guidelines on the temporal aspect of DPH should arguably pertain to how this aspect 
should be treated under the wings of a two-class division. 
 
6 Precautions in cases of doubt 
For the combatant faced with civilians involved to various extents in hostilities, there will 
necessarily often be an element of doubt re whether such involvement constitutes direct 
participation and the civilian can be legitimately targeted. How such doubt should be 
treated from a legal-theoretical standpoint will admittedly not be of the greatest import 
directly in a situation where reliance on instinct is perhaps of more immediate value, but 
in providing guidelines for the combatant and facilitate military planning a theoretical 
approach to the problem is fundamental. Clear rules of engagement is of important in 
facilitating adherence to IHL in armed conflict, and clarification of how combatants 
should relate to situations of doubt  
 
For practical purposes, the main views of how direct participation should be construed in 
cases of doubt can be classified as restrictive and liberal pertaining to interpretation of 
”direct”. It is worth noting that doubt as to civilian or combatant status should not be 
confused with doubt regarding direct participation. The former is explicitly regulated in 
treaty law, stating plainly that a person be considered a civilian in case of doubt 
regarding his or her status, while the latter is not. 
 
6.1 Restrictive view 
The view that ”determination [of DPH] must be made in good faith and in view of all 
information available in the concrete situation” seems self-evident considering the 
general principle of precaution in IHL. Extending on this, it can be argued that, in case of 
reasonable doubt as to whether a civilian constitutes a legitimate military target, the 
general principle of precaution must come to the benefit of the civilian. Melzer argues in 
favour of such a view and adds that: ”As a matter of logical juridical reasoning, for each 
category, the general rule established by the law must apply until the requirements for 
an exception are fulfilled”. Bearing in mind that doubt regarding the DPH question 
pertains to how these requirements for an exception should be interpreted, this does not 
seem particularly enlightening. The same author also combines the concepts of 
”reasonable” and ”persisting” doubt; in this regard it seems worthwhile to point out that 
while reasonable doubt, admittedly, should probably lead to presumption of protection 
against direct attack, which was the general view emanating from the third ICRC expert 
meeting, persisting doubt would necessarily entail continuous civilian acts of a 
doubt-incurring nature arguably pointing in the direction of finding direct participation.  
 
The restrictive view on the issue of doubt, then, seems to set a standard of ”reasonable 
doubt”; a combatant should do everything feasible to determine whether or not he is 
attacking a legitimate target. The question should be answered by determining on which 
side of neutral the civilian appears to be with the intelligence available at the time. 
 
6.2 Liberal view 
The liberal view is also based on one of the underlying purposes of IHL, namely the 
protection of the civilian population, but applies different means to this end in the context 
of doubt. One author argues that grey areas should indeed be interpreted liberally and in 
favour of finding direct participation, and states that: ”Although it might seem 
counter-intuitive to broadly interpret the activities that subject civilians to attack, in fact, 
doing so is likely to enhance the protection of the civilian population as a whole”, without 
elaborating further. The logic does seem to be that a ”hard-line” towards civilian 
participation in hostilities will scare other persons from engaging in hostilities: ”[..] a 
liberal approach creates an incentive for civilians to remain as distant from the conflict as 
possible”. While logically sound, it seems questionable if such an incentive will indeed 
be sufficient for discouraging civilian participation, and – importantly – strengthening 
general civilian protection by removing a specific protection seems of  somewhat 
dubious merit. 
 
The second main argument for such an approach to the question of doubt lies in the 
balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations. Although 
protection of the civilian population is of fundamental to IHL, the law also recognizes a 
military need to conduct operations efficiently, and seeks to propitiate this need.  If a 
liberal interpretation provides clearer guidelines for combatants, it is of value re military 
necessity and can thus be weighed against humanitarian considerations favourably for 
finding direct participation in cases of doubt. However, assessing that it provides 
combatants with clearer guidelines if they are able to establish direct participation by 
interpreting the rule liberally seems conceited. Arbitrary targeting of civilians can hardly 
be stated militarily necessary. 
 
6.3 Resulting treatment of doubt in determining direct participation in hostilities 
It seems unclear whether a liberal approach to the problem of doubt entails assessing 
that reasonable doubt should equal direct participation or it merely comprises the view 
that the term reasonable doubt itself should be interpreted liberally. In the latter case, it 
hardly provides clarification of the issue and thus does not seem to carry any substantial 
weight. In the case of the former, its proximity to arbitrariness seems ominous.  
 
Targeting decisions in cases of doubt of direct participation should be based on a 
reasonable evaluation considering the information available at the time and the 
perceptions of a reasonable combatant. Providing further guidelines of interpretation for 
the term ”reasonable doubt” in this context would probably only jumble the evaluation. 
 
7 Conclusions 
Providing a definitive definition of the term ”direct participation in hostilities” seems 
difficult, or, indeed, impossible. The complexities of the issue are such that legal opinion 
are diverse and differing, and they will probably remain that way. However, guidelines 
pertaining to how DPH should be construed in a situation of armed conflict are essential 
and cannot be neglected on the grounds that a conclusive definition of DPH is 
nonviable.  
 
Treaty wording not providing an express definition of DPH, clarifying the content of the 
DPH rule is instrumental to providing such guidelines. A clarification that does not 
incorporate the most disputed elements is probably sound; introducing interpretations 
and views that cannot be reasonably deduced legally from treaty wording may not shed 
light on the issue at all.  
 
The notion of ”hostilities” in the DPH rule is not equivalent to ”armed conflict”, although 
any act considered as direct participation in hostilities must be conducted in the context 
of armed conflict. Hostilities is a term linked to acts, whereas armed conflict is first and 
foremost a state. For DPH purposes, hostilities could be defined as acts of violence 
apparently directed against a party to the conflict. Whilst not being a concluding 
definition, restricting the notion  of hostilities further may exclude acts that arguably 
should fall within the scope of DPH. It is also important to underline that ”conflict” here 
should not include disputes and riots not qualifying as armed conflict. 
 
An act of participation in hostilities has to be direct. Any interpretation of direct should be 
based on treaty law, and the farther one positions an interpretation from a conventional 
legal definition of the term, the more disputable the explication will become. It seem 
clear that for an act to fall within the scope of direct, it should have an inherent harm 
potential. Furthermore, there should be a direct causal between the act and the damage. 
Additionally, while the act should pertain to an instance of hostilities to qualify as direct, 
explicit intention on part of the civilian in this respect should probably not be required. 
 
Treaty wording merely dictating that suspension of protection from attack shall only last 
”for such time” as the civilian is participating directly in hostilities, the temporal aspect of 
DPH is not clarified by the treaties themselves. Regarding the underlying principles of 
IHL, it may seem contrary to the law if one extends the duration of suspension of 
protection beyond that of an instance of participation. However, if a civilian is 
continuously participating in hostilities, treating such behaviour as one continuous 
instance of participation does not seem contrary to IHL when one acknowledges that 
such a level of participation seems functionally identical to that of a combatant. This 
should not, however, mean that any act of participation will lead to permanent 
suspension of protection; civilians whose participation is not essentially similar to that of 
a combatant should regain protection after an instance of participation. Applying this 
method does entail treating civilians differently under treaty law, and one should 
consequently exercise restraint in branding a civilian ”functional combatant”.  
 
With a view to the great wars of the 20th century, it seems that ”Jerry” or ”the Boches” 
have disappeared from today’s armed conflict, and have in many cases been replaced 
by the incompetent resistance of the civilian. However, the law of armed conflict 
remains, and its core values and principles are becoming no less relevant as time 
passes. 
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